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Short Title: Pathways to attention deficits in TSC






Background	Tuberous Sclerosis Complex (TSC) is a genetic disorder associated with a range of neurocognitive manifestations, including neuropsychological attention deficits most notably in dual tasking/divided attention. These dual task deficits have so far been interpreted as evidence of a vulnerable ‘cognitive module’ in TSC. Here we suggest that this interpretation represents an ‘adult neuropsychological’ perspective and argue that a developmental approach would be more appropriate to examine attention deficits in TSC.
Method	We examined the pathway to ‘endstate’ dual task deficits in twenty 6 to 16 year olds with TSC utilizing the Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch). We predicted that the pattern of attentional deficits in TSC would support a ‘conditional’ model where the establishment of a later-expected skill was dependent on the functional maturation of an earlier expected skill.
Results		Attentional profiles showed statistical support for a conditional model. Only one child showed a deterministic pattern while one showed a hybrid pattern, attributed to the admixture of a surgically-acquired lesion and a neurodevelopmental disorder










Over the last ten years, powerful arguments have emerged for conceptual differences between the static ‘adult neuropsychology’ approaches to acquired brain lesions and the more dynamic ‘neuroconstructivist’ approaches to the study of developmental disorders (Bishop 1997; Johnson 2001; Johnson et al. 2002; Karmiloff-Smith 1997, 1998; Oliver et al. 2000; Quartz 1999; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith 2002). An adult neuropsychological model uses double dissociation studies of the fully-matured brain to conclude that the brain is organized into specific modules or specialized networks that underlie specific cognitive skills. A genetic defect may therefore lead to a specific deficit in an innate cognitive module. In contrast, a neuroconstructivist model argues for a process of gradual modularization where the normal pattern of pre- and post-natal brain development is dynamically influenced by environmental and genetic factors that may trigger variable cascades of aberrant development towards abnormal ‘endstates’. For an excellent review, see Karmiloff-Smith (1998).
Karmiloff-Smith and others highlighted that a neuroconstructivist model does not suggest that any function can be subserved by any part of the developing brain, but rather that domain-relevant mechanisms gradually become domain-specific through activity-dependent learning (Karmiloff-Smith 1998; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002). This progressive modularization is therefore under the influence of both intrinsic developmental factors and activity-dependent mechanisms (Karmiloff-Smith 1992, 1997, 1998; Quartz 1999). Brain development is viewed as a cascade of increasingly complex representations, in which the development of some regions are conditional on the prior establishment of others (Fuster 1997; Huttenlocher & Dabholkar 1997; Quartz 1999).
Evidence for and against neuroconstructivist approaches have been sought in the study of developmental disorders such as dyslexia (Goswami 2003) and autism (Cohen 1994; Gustafsson 1997), and in the development of language and face processing skills using computational modelling (see Karmiloff-Smith & Thomas 2004 for a review). Karmiloff-Smith, in particular, has focused on Williams Syndrome, a neurogenetic disorder, as a prototypical neuroconstructivist model (see e.g. Karmiloff-Smith 1998; Thomas & Karmiloff-Smith 2002).

ATTENTIONAL SKILLS IN TUBEROUS SCLEROSIS COMPLEX (TSC)
Tuberous Sclerosis Complex (TSC) is a multi-system genetic disorder associated with a mutation in one of two genes, the TSC1 gene on chromosome 9q34 or the TSC2 gene on chromosome 16p13.3 (Povey et al. 1994). Hamartin and tuberin, the protein products of TSC1 and TSC2 act as an intracellular complex and participates in a range of important signaling cascades involved in cell growth, proliferation, and survival as well as nutrient and energy sensing and protein synthesis (for a recent review, see Crino et al. 2006). Apart from manifestations in peripheral organs such as the kidneys, skin and heart, research evidence has shown that individuals with TSC are at high risk for a range of cognitive and behavioural difficulties (de Vries & Prather 2007), but in particular, for neuropsychological deficits of attentional and executive skills, even when their global intellectual abilities are within normal limits and even when they may not meet diagnostic criteria for a developmental disorder such as ADHD (see Prather & de Vries 2004, for a review). Regular evaluation of these skills have been suggested in consensus clinical guidelines for the assessment of cognition in TSC (de Vries et al. 2005).
Even though the genetic abnormality seen in TSC occurs during embryological development, no studies have so far examined the cognitive manifestations of TSC in a neuroconstructivist way. Instead, most interpretations of cognitive deficits in TSC have used an adult neuropsychological approach. For example, in a study of a population-based sample of children with TSC at the normal or near-normal end of the bimodal distribution of global intellectual abilities, de Vries (2001) reported that seventeen of the nineteen children with TSC (89%) included in the study showed deficits in one or more attentional domain as measured by the Test of Everyday Attention for Children (Manly et al. 1999, Manly et al. 2001). Poor performance on the Sky Search Dual Task, a cross-modal dual task, was the most consistent deficit among the TSC children even when IQ was controlled for, while performance on the selective attention tasks was least likely to be impaired. The author interpreted findings as suggesting that selective attention may be a relatively ‘resilient’ domain, while dual task abilities might be more ‘vulnerable’ to disruption by the pathogenetic mechanisms of TSC and argued that dual task difficulty (DTD) may be a ‘core deficit’ in the disorder (de Vries 2001). See, for instance similarities with Fernandes et al. (2005).
While some progress has therefore been made in describing the ‘endstate’ attentional profile of TSC in comparison to that of non-TSC children, this paper argues that the above interpretation was an oversimplified view, due to an absent developmental perspective of the cognitive sequelae observed. No information was provided with regards to how each child reached the dual task deficit ‘endstate’ (see Karmiloff-Smith 1997) or whether deficits in one attentional domain may have impacted the establishment of other attentional skills.

Developmental studies have shown that different attentional components emerge (a neuropsychological skill in the early stages of acquisition), develop (a partially acquired component functional to a degree) and become established/mature (a fully acquired neuropsychological skill) at different stages in parallel with the ‘spurts and plateaus’ of structural and physiological brain maturation from birth into adulthood (Dennis, 1989; Hudspeth & Pribram 1990; Luciana & Nelson 1998; McKay et al. 1987; Shepp et al. 1987). Selective visual attention or ‘executive attention’ continues to develop throughout childhood, but stabilize at near-adult levels of performance by about 8 years of age (Posner et al. 2006). Alerting and orienting skills also emerges in early infancy (Posner et al. 2006). Using the Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch) and other tasks, Anderson and colleagues showed that sustained attention matures and reaches near-adult levels around the age of 10 with only minor improvements after that age (Betts et al. 2006). Even though the higher-order components of attention such as dual-tasking start to emerge throughout childhood, alongside the emergence, development and establishment of selective and sustained attention, dual tasking and other integrational skills continue to mature into adulthood (see e.g. Pascualvaca & Morote 2000).

HYPOTHESES
In the present study, we revisited, with permission, the original study data of de Vries (2001) to explore the interrelation between selective attention skills, sustained attention and dual task performance in children with TSC. The null hypothesis (H0) as presently accepted in the literature is that these three attentional skills develop independently in a deterministic fashion (see figure 1, Model I). We made two alternative hypotheses in the context of the theoretical background outlined above. The main alternative hypothesis (H1M) was that that a conditional rather than a deterministic model would explain the pattern of attention deficits observed in TSC. That is, we predicted that in the presence of impairment in an attentional component expected to mature earlier, subsequent attentional skills will not have become established due to disruption of the conditional developmental cascade (Quartz 1999), and thus also show impaired performance. The secondary alternative hypothesis (H1S) predicted that there would be different patterns of selective and sustained attention in association with Dual Task Deficits (DTD), supporting the notion of differential trajectories towards DTD ‘endstates’ (see figure 1, model II).















Two measures were used to assess global intellectual ability. The British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS-II) (Dunn & Dunn 1997) was used as a measure of verbal ability. The Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) (Raven 1956) was used as a measure of non-verbal ability. The BPVS and CPM, two well-known and validated tools, were selected for two reasons. Firstly, the authors wanted to ensure that attentional skills were evaluated in the context of general intellectual ability; Secondly, the authors wanted relatively short measures of intelligence that would not have had very high attentional demands.

Attentional abilities
The Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch) was used (Manly et al. 1999; Manly et al. 2001). The TEA-Ch is a standardized and normed pen-and-paper clinical battery that provides measures of selective attention, sustained attention and attentional control/switching through the use of 9 game-like tasks. Raw scores are converted into age-scaled scores in 6 separate age bands for boys and girls between the ages of 6 and 16. Similar to tests such as the Wechsler Scales of Intelligence, age-scaled scores have a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 3. In addition, percentile bands are provided. The subtests used for the purpose of this paper are briefly described. For further detail of the overall tool and subtests, please see Manly et al. 2001.

Sky Search (selective attention)
In this timed subtest, children have to find as many pairs of identical spaceships (targets) among pairs of non-identical spaceships (distractors) on a page by putting a circle around the pairs that look the same. The second part of the subtest contains no distractors, thus allowing for a motor control component. The performance measure is the Sky Search Attention Score (SSAS). The SSAS is derived from the time per target in the first part of the task minus the time per target in the motor control part of the task.

Score! (sustained attention)
Children are asked to count the number of ‘scoring’ sounds heard on an audiotape, as if keeping score on a computer game. There are long and variable gaps between ‘score sounds’, thus giving little to grab or hold a child’s attention. After every game the child is asked how many sounds he/she counted. The performance measure is the number of games correct out of a maximum of 10.

Sky Search Dual Task (DT) (divided attention)




The original study was conducted with the relevant ethical approval. All families received written information about the study. Informed written consent was obtained from all participants and their parents/guardians.
For the purpose of this paper, no additional measures were administered. The original data collected by de Vries (2001) were anonymized, and used here for statistical re-analysis.

Data analysis
In contrast to the group-wise comparisons of the earlier study (de Vries 2001), this study focused on the interrelation of attentional skills within subjects. Subjects were classified as having either an ‘unimpaired, functional’ ability or an ‘impaired’ performance on each of the three tasks selected for this paper. For the purpose of the study ‘impaired’ performance was operationalized, per neuropsychological convention, as performance below 2SD (or below the 2nd percentile) of the population mean on the specified subtest. The percentile bands in the TEA-Ch indicated that a score of 4 fell across the 1.5th to the 3.3rd percentile. A scaled score of 4 or less was therefore chosen to indicate ‘impaired performance’ on each of the subtests administered. ‘Impaired’ performance did not imply an inability to perform a task. Children who were unable to perform a task due to poor comprehension of instructions, were excluded from the original study. Where a child was unable to complete a task due to the neuropsychological demands of the task, a scaled score of 0 (zero) was awarded. ‘Unimpaired functional’ ability was operationalized as standardized scores greater than 4.

By chance, one of 8 patterns of test performance would be expected across the three tasks. These patterns are ABD, aBD, AbD, ABd, Abd, aBd, abD, abd where: 
A = unimpaired, functional selective attention; a = impaired selective attention
B = unimpaired, functional sustained attention; b = impaired sustained attention
D = unimpaired, functional dual task performance; d = impaired dual task performance

Taking together knowledge about the normal sequence of attentional development (see introduction) and the chance expectation of attentional patterns, the 8 predicted patterns were divided into those that would support a deterministic model and those that would support a conditional model. The criteria are outlined in table 1. In essence, if a child had an unimpaired, functional ability in a skill that was expected to develop later whilst having impairment in an earlier expected skill, the empirical evidence would refute a conditional pattern of attentional development. If, on the other hand, a child showed impairment in a later expected skill in the presence of an impairment in the earlier expected skill, the evidence would be consistent with the conditional model. The focus of this paper was an examination of the proportion of cases consistent with a conditional model and the proportion not consistent with a conditional profile, in other words, a binomial disjoint classification.

Table 1 about here

Examination of the chance expected patterns showed that in a sample of 20 we would expect ten (10) cases to fall into each of conditional and deterministic categories. In order to ask whether particular patterns were over- or under-represented in the sample, standardized residuals were calculated for each category to compare the observed frequency with the expected frequency. Standardised residuals (Agresti 1990) were calculated as: 
[observed frequency – expected frequency]/(√(expected frequency)

Assuming the null hypothesis (independence of attentional skills), chi-square values and level of significance was calculated comparing expected frequencies with those actually observed. If any expected frequency was under five, Fisher’s exact test was used to compare rates.

Power calculations
We made an apriori prediction that around 90% of cases would support a conditional model. Under the null hypothesis it is assumed that 50% of cases would support one or other of the models. A method of evaluating the power of such a test is given by Agresti (1990, pp 241-243). The non-centrality parameter for a Pearson chi-square compares the true proportions of cases supporting both models with those expected under the null hypothesis. For a sample size of 20 (as in our paper), the noncentrality parameter = 0.64*20 = 12.8 which equals the Pearson chi-square value of this study (see results). Table 7.12 (Agresti 1990) indicates that the power for a noncentrality parameter of 12.8, df = 1, is greater than 93%.







The BPVS, Raven’s and age scaled scores for all subjects in the study are shown in table 2. In addition, the observed pattern using the AaBbDd nomenclature as described above is shown, as well as the criterion met in individual cases, as outlined in table 1.

Table 2 about here

The main alternative hypothesis (H1M) – Conditional versus deterministic patterns of interrelation between attention deficits
Eighteen of the cases fulfilled criteria for a conditional model of attentional skills. Two cases fulfilled criteria for a deterministic model (cases 2 and 10). In case 2, an impaired score on the sustained attention task (age scaled score = 4) was not associated with a dual task deficit, as would be expected in a conditional model. In case 10, selective attention (age scaled score = 4) and dual task ability (age scaled score = 1) showed deficits in the presence of an ability to perform the sustained attention task satisfactorily (age scaled score = 7).
The standardized residual (SR) scores calculated for each of the conditions indicated that the conditional model was more prevalent (SR = +2.53), while the deterministic model was less prevalent (SR = -2.53) than would have been expected if attentional impairments were occurring independently of each other. The difference in prevalence between conditional and deterministic models was statistically significant (χ2 = 12.8; df = 1; p < 0.001).
At first glance, the findings above therefore rejected the null-hypothesis and deterministic outcomes in the sample and therefore suggested that attentional patterns observed can be represented as a conditional model, as shown in figure 1, Model II. However, on closer examination, it became clear that two of the conditional patterns (C1 and C4) may be consistent with either a conditional or a deterministic pattern. That is, a subject who has unimpaired performance on all 3 attentional components (ABD) or one who has impairment across all three (abd), may support a conditional model without ruling our a deterministic model. For this reason, all cases meeting criteria C1 and C4 were excluded for subsequent analysis.
We returned to the original de Vries (2001) data, and discovered that one of the two subjects who showed a deterministic pattern (subject number 10; impaired selective attention+unimpaired sustained attention+impaired dual tasking) had neurosurgery to remove a cortical tuber from the anterior cingulate cortex between the age of 4 and 7 years (clinical data not specific). Neurosurgical removal of a brain tumour would have produced an acquired lesion, and, as this paper wished to explore the natural developmental rather than acquired attentional trajectories in TSC, the case was therefore removed for final analysis.
Under the above conditions, excluding C1 and C4 subjects as well as subject 10, eight out of 9 subjects showed a conditional pattern of attentional skills (two-sided binomial exact p-value = 0.039). This is underlined by the Wilson 95% confidence interval of (0.57, 0.98), which therefore excludes 0.5 (Wilson 1927). Eight out of nine cases were therefore statistically significantly different from 50%, thus supporting the alternative hypothesis (H1M).

The secondary alternative hypothesis (H1S) – attentional profiles associated with ‘endstate’ dual task deficits (DTD)
As predicted, there were different profiles of impairment seen with DTD. Table 2 shows that six cases had impairment in the selective attention, the sustained attention and the dual task (pattern 1 – abd), three cases had functional selective attention but impairments in sustained attention and the dual task (pattern 2 – Abd), five cases had functional selective attention and sustained attention, but impaired performance on the dual task (pattern 3 – ABd), and four cases had functional skills on all three tasks (pattern 4 – ABD).

The role of global intellectual ability






The paper examined the interrelation between selective attention, sustained attention and dual task deficits in TSC and the pathway to the endstate dual task deficits. The study rejected a deterministic pattern of attention skills where the likelihood of one deficit is independent of another. Instead, cases showed a pattern consistent with a conditional relationship between selective attention, sustained attention and dual task abilities. Results suggested that the majority of attentional profiles were predictable with a step-wise conditional model. Examination of superficially similar dual task deficit ‘endstates’ showed that three distinct patterns of attention deficits were present in relation to such deficits (abd, Abd, ABd).
Taken together, the data showed that if an attentional component expected to become established at an earlier stage did not reach a sufficient level of functional integrity, domains expected to reach functional maturity at a later stage did not develop appropriately. The data also showed that the establishment of a functional attentional component did not preclude aberrant development of a later-maturing attentional component, suggesting that, in TSC, the developmental cascade may be interrupted or arrested at various stages of neuropsychological development.
The two cases that supported a deterministic epigenesis (cases 2 and 10) were of interest. In both instances subjects had age-scaled scores of 4 on the ‘impaired’ subtests. Whilst these cases may indeed provide support for the non-conditional development of selective and sustained attention skills in some cases, it is noteworthy that a score of 4 on the TEA-Ch falls across the 1.5th to the 3.3rd percentile, with a range of 1.8 percentile points. This includes the 2nd percentile, traditionally used as a cut-off to indicate ‘impaired performance’ on neuropsychological tasks. Cut-off values can, of course, never be considered as absolute values in neurobiological terms. We suggest that a score of 4 on the TEA-Ch should be viewed as a ‘borderline’ score where a child may or may not have reached a sufficient level of development of that skill to support development of the subsequent step. As outlined earlier, a conditional epigenesis approach requires ‘the partial functioning of neural pathways’ (Johnson et al. 2002, p526). We would therefore argue that cases 2 and 10 had sufficient partial functioning in order to facilitate the subsequent step in the developmental cascade. 
Case 10 was excluded from final analysis when it was realized that the 7 year old girl had had neurosurgery to remove a lesion in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) between the age of 4 and 7 years. We argue that surgery, in this instance, led to focal disruption of her selective attention skills, which had by then become partially modularized in the ACC, the primary site for selective attentional ability in the mature brain. The case was therefore a fascinating example of the interaction between developmental and acquired brain models in real life.
To our knowledge the data presented here are the first, albeit preliminary, to provide empirical evidence for a step-wise conditional model as a plausible alternative to traditional adult models for the study of neuropsychological development in TSC. This position does not refute any of the dissociation and double dissociation studies performed on populations where skills are lost after they had become established, but provides evidence that such ‘acquired injury’ models may be inappropriate in neurodevelopmental populations. As highlighted above, case number 10 provided an interesting example of the potential combinatorial effect of a developmental and an acquired causal model.
The neuroconstructivist findings in this study highlight the importance of appropriate strategies to investigate the putative determinants of cognitive deficits in TSC. We concur with Karmiloff-Smith’s suggestions that only a truly developmental cognitive neuroscience approach is likely to shed light on the mechanisms underlying aberrant outcomes in neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith, 1997, 1998). For example, a child with pattern 3 (only a dual task deficit), it is highly likely to have an entirely different set of genetic, epigenetic, and other neurobiological determinants from a child who has pattern 1 (dual task deficits in addition to sustained attention and selective attention deficits). Simplistic dichotomized comparison of those with and without dual task deficits (or arguably with and without mental retardation or any specific cognitive deficit) would follow an adult neuropsychological approach and may therefore lack sufficient fine-grain subgrouping to perform useful molecular biological, MRI or other analysis.
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Table 1. Criteria for deterministic and conditional models of attentional development.

Consistent with a conditional epigenesis model	Consistent with a deterministic epigenesis model (violations of a conditional model)
C1: abdC2: AbdC3: ABdC4: ABD	D1: aBDD2: abDD3: AbDD4: aBd
A = unimpaired, functional selective attention; a = impaired selective attention
B = unimpaired, functional sustained attention; b = impaired sustained attention





Table 2. The profile of attentional skills in children with tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC). The table shows BPVS and RCPM scores, age-scaled scores on the three TEA-Ch subtests, and lists the observed pattern and developmental epigenesis criterion met.

Subject code	Age and sex	BPVS	RCPM	Selective Attention (Aa)	Sustained Attention (Bb)	Dual Task Performance (Dd)	Observed Pattern	Criterion met (see table 1)
				Sky Search SS	Score! SS	SSDT SS		
1234567891011121314151617181920	15y; F11y; F11y; M12y; M9y; M10y; M14y; M12y; M10y; M7y; F7y; M16y; F6y; M12y; M12y; M9y; F13y; F8y; F15y; F12y; M	9191981058756366489109716311076858964809688	9488114941195360637510075581051001048063739770	11851061110941610882121110	6479101117732796134124	711171000110111911181	ABDAbDABdABDABdabdabdAbdABdaBdabdAbdABdABdABDabdabdabdABDAbd	C4D3C3C4C3C1C1C2C3D4C1C2C3C3C4C1C1C1C4C2
Mean score = 10; standard deviation = 3; ‘impaired’ ≤ 4
BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale (standardized score)






Figure 1. Graphic representation of deterministic versus conditional patterns of attentional development. In a deterministic model (Model I) there is independent development of selective (A), sustained (B) and divided attention (D). In a conditional model (Model II), the emergence of one domain is conditional on the partial/sufficient emergence of a domain expected to develop earlier.
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